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Snježana Prijić-Samaržija’s book discusses the epistemic grounding of 
democracy, stressing the epistemic role of experts in her political-episte-
mological favorite, the project of “reliability democracy”. Her proposal, 
inspired by Christiano, lets citizens play an important role in setting the 
aims, whereas experts deliberate about means of reaching them. I argue 
that it is not easy to reach consensus about goals and values. What is 
needed is democratic deliberation in deciding, encompassing both ex-
perts and laypersons. We should retain the duality of less ideal delibera-
tion in real world and of hypothetical contractualist deliberation, within 
moral-political thought-experiments, in the tradition of Habermas and 
Scanlon in the ideal theory. I leave it open whether our author might 
ultimately agree with this picture of reliability democracy.
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1. An important defense of hybrid virtues
In the present paper I want to discuss the (2018) book by Snježana Prijić-
Samaržija entitled Democracy and Truth: The Confl ict between Political 
and Epistemic Virtues.1 I fi nd it to be a very important book, and a fi ne 
continuation of Snježana’s work on social epistemology (I shall be using 
her fi rst name, “Snježana”, to refer to her, since we have been friends for 
decades.) The book is bringing together epistemic virtues and political 
goals, systematizing and presenting a lot of recent literature and of-
fering an original view on the role on experts in public deliberation. (It 
should be translated into Croatian for home readers!). I am happy to be 
1 The paper was written for the issue of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy 
on political philosophy. Unfortunately, I made a technical mistake, and did not 
submit it for the issue. Snježana-Prijić did write some lines of reply (Prijić Samaržija 
2020a), using the manuscript, and the reply appeared in the issue to which I did 
not contribute my paper on time. I thank her a lot, and I apologize for the mistake I 
made. So, the paper is appearing in the present volume.
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able to discuss it with the author; we already had a round of discussion 
in Maribor, and it was extremely useful, to me, a least.
Here is then the preview. The fi rst section gives a brief sketch of 
the views proposed in the book, concluding with one of the central is-
sues from it, namely the role and the choice of experts. I argue that 
Snježana’s proposal is opened to a diffi cult dilemma, worthy of address-
ing in detail. The second section contains a brief sketch of my contrac-
tualist proposal concerning the choice of experts and the nature of pub-
lic deliberation. I leave it open whether the proposal is compatible with 
Snježana’s views; this is in fact my main question for her.
In recent presentations, for instance in Maribor and Belgrade, both 
in 2019, she has placed her proposal in the political context of pres-
ent “crisis of democracy”. She listed the well-known symptoms, most of 
which we all recognize:
Radicalization, terrorism, fundamentalism, souverenism, xenopho-
bia, nationalism, chauvinism...
Trump, Brexit, Orban… different kinds of populism.
Pseudo-science: anti-vaxxers, creationism, climate changes deniers, 
etc.
Too much democracy?
Too little (real) democracy?
We shall return to this context at the end of the fi rst section and stay 
within it till the end.
The book itself begins with a telling quote by Emma Goldman, con-
necting an epistemic state – ignorance with a political dimension of 
violence: “The most violent element in society is ignorance.” (1910: 3). 
Ignorance comprises “reliance on stereotypes and prejudices, evident 
disregard for rational and responsible decision-making (…)”, and an 
obvious lack of awareness about cognitive and evidential limitations, 
epistemic egoism and the like (Prijić-Samaržija 2018: 11).  Snježana 
then notes: “Yet, while violence is consistently faced with unanimous 
condemnation, the ignorance from which it stems remains exempt from 
any kind of direct scientifi c scrutiny” (2018: 11).
Snježana then gives an excellent overview of the political epistemol-
ogy in the last seven or eight decades, from Rawls to present-day think-
ers. She criticizes political instrumentalism (which she ascribes to 
political philosophers from Rawls to epistemic proceduralism, consen-
sualism, but also to postmodernism (authors like F. Peter, D. Estlund, 
P. Kitcher, and M. Fricker), i.e. reduction of epistemic virtues to politi-
cal virtues. She is equally critical of epistemological instrumentalism, 
the view which favors reduction of political virtues to epistemic virtues 
(of truth) (e.g. epistemologists in standard analytical epistemology, 
from Goldman’s very moderate stance to Neven Sesardić’s radical ver-
sions. She talks of the anti – democratic character of both political and 
epistemological instrumentalism (mostly in chapter Four of the book). 
Her sympathies lie with what she calls “hybrid standpoint”, favoring 
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harmonization of political and epistemic virtues instead of reduction. 
So she criticizes both elitism (epistemic instrumentalism that pre-
fers truth to justice) and egalitarianism (political instrumentalism, 
embodied both in epistemic proceduralism and consensualism); this is 
done in section 4 of chapter Two. Her preferences are with the hybrid 
standpoint, involving contextualism and localism. The main area of 
application of the standpoint is justifi cation of democracy (Chapters 
Three to the concluding chapter Six). I think her discussion of hybrid 
virtues is highly relevant: it is an important defence of a plausible 
standpoint in political epistemology. Let me add that in my view this 
hybrid combination would work also on the critical side, for the purpose 
of criticizing given social arrangements for being both epistemically 
and politically bad; this would be an interesting line in critical social 
epistemology.
Let me note her attitude to Habermasian project of deliberative de-
mocracy; I shall express my partial disagreement in a moment. Haber-
mas started his project of contractualist justifi cation of politics by ap-
pealing to deliberation in idealized circumstances. But then in his work 
Between Facts and Norms (1992) he connected it to normal, non-ideal 
“deliberative politics”. To quote a standard reading of his fi nal result, 
building on his notion of discourse, Habermas understands delibera-
tive politics to refer to institutionalized discursive procedures of will 
formation and decision making within constitutional political systems 
(Deitelhoff  2018: 528).
Snježana notes that she accepts his consensualism, but rejects his 
picture of the procedure that is to lead to consensus:
The fundamental problem of Habermas’ consensualism, consensualist 
theory of making fair decisions, or his consensualist theory of justice, is 
its dubious application in conditions that are less than ideal. Achieving a 
rational consensus in idealized communicational circumstances – implying 
a sincere, tolerant, argument-based and informed, institutionally well orga-
nized and guided debate – is certainly an attractive and highly acceptable 
goal. However, any sub-ideal moral and epistemic circumstances render the 
concept of a ‘rational’ consensus entirely unclear. (2018: 168)
Finally, in chapter Six, Snježana opts for “reliability democracy” char-
acterized by fulfi lling fi ve veritistic criteria that should guarantee the 
epis temic quality of a procedure. Here is her list, inspired by Goldman: 
(i) reliability, or the ratio of true and false deci sions generated by this 
procedure; (ii) power, or total productivity in producing beliefs; (iii) fe-
cundity, or the capacity of a social practice or institutions to solve the 
problems of interested citizens; (iv) speed or the time required (…); (v) 
effi cacy; or the cost of achieving goals (2018: 202)
As can be guessed from what I said until now, I agree with a lot of 
what Snježana says. Most importantly, about truth being the goal of 
deliberation.
One of the main topics of the book is the positive role of experts 
in the social and political cognition, as typical for reliability democ-
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racy. She borrows some ideas from Thomas Christiano on the division 
of epistemic labor, where lay-persons choose the aims of society, and 
experts decide about means. Here is Snježana’s summary of her view 
from her recent paper discussing her book:
Although experts are conventionally excluded from democratic procedures 
out of fear of epistocracy, or of undemocratic elite privilege, I hold that the 
exclusion of experts is a conscious sacrifi ce of epistemic quality, and, con-
sequently, of the best democratic decisions. If epistemic justifi cation is re-
quired for justifying democracy, then excluding experts is just as undemo-
cratic as excluding citizens. (2020: 59)
Finally, the relevant chapter of the book, culminates with the following 
statement:
So, in contrast to the reliabilist concept of externalism in which decisions 
are epistemically and democratically justifi ed as long as there are reliable 
democratic mechanisms that produce truth-sensitive decisions, I would like 
to stress a certain need for more participation or for better epistemic and 
democratic access of citizens and policy makers to decisions. More precise-
ly, while the responsibility of a reliability democrat would be to insure a 
reliable democratic procedure, the internalist approach, in whose favor I 
am arguing, stresses that it is necessary for citizens and policy-makers to 
understand why it is rational to rely on expertise and reliable democratic 
procedures and why it is rational to trust to these very procedures. Even if 
citizens and policy-makers cannot have full understanding or possess the 
total body of evidence to appraise the whole content of the experts’ stances, 
their reliance or trust would be epistemically justifi ed as long as they have 
enough evidence about the reliability of the procedures through which ex-
perts make their decisions. (2020: 216)2
So what is required is the division of roles: consensus is fi ne for ideal 
theory, for the non-ideal one we need experts (2018: 170). How are the 
experts to be chosen? Snježana proposes a consensual choice of experts. 
But what should the consensus be like? In the rest of this paper, I shall 
concentrate on varieties of consensual choice, and point to the delibera-
tive procedure as a possible important context of such a choice.
So, how does the choice proceed? Here, there are different readings 
that are possible, and I shall concentrate on the two of them.
Reading one: the lay-population as a whole chooses the experts.
Reading two: various groups within lay population choose each 
their own expert(s).
2 And she continues about the evidence of reliability of experts’ procedures:
For instance, that could consist of evidence about the experts’ moral and epistemic 
characters (or the reputation of the institutions), evidence about the contextual 
(conversational) circumstances that prevent deception, lying and incompetence 
or support trustworthiness, or even proof of the presence of Christiano’s truth 
sensitive mechanisms such as solidarity, overlapping understanding, competition 
and sanctions. More precisely, the democratic division of epistemic labor needs 
to embrace more epistemic agency on the side of citizens: they should have an 
active role in assessing which particular experts deserve trust and whether 
reliable mechanisms truly preserve the experts’ trustworthiness. (2020: 216)
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Snježana’s explicit formulations seem to go more in the direction 
of the fi rst reading. She talks about consensus preceding the choice; 
but the choice is consensual, and grounded in the will of the whole lay 
population. She appeals to Rawls’ idea of “overlapping consensus” pre-
ceding important decisions, and not following from them. In her pro-
posal it is a consensus generated by “public debate and conciliation of 
all interested participants” (2018: 192); she sees her view as “a certain 
amalgam of Rawls’s and Habermas’ proposals” (2018: 192)
If the fi rst option is her choice, then we have a point of disagree-
ment: I would opt for the second option. Let me develop the matters us-
ing Snježana’s characterization of our political context, namely crisis of 
democracy. It encompasses, as we noted at the beginning of the paper, 
phenomena like
Radicalization, terrorism, fundamentalism, souverenism, xenopho-
bia, nationalism, chauvinism...
Trump, Brexit, Orban…different kinds of populism
Pseudo-science: anti-vaxxers, creationism, climate changes deniers, 
etc.
We, the truth-respecting theoreticians, have two options.
Option one, let experts have a fi nal word both on goals-values and 
on means to reach them. Option two, citizens contribute their val-
ues, and decide about aims.
But, how do we arrive at a consensus about who is the expert on such 
situation(s), consensus that is to precede political deliberation?
Start with option one: experts alone are to decide. But then, who 
are the typical experts for goals and value? The usual criteria don’t 
fare well with this question. Look at the list of criteria i.e. summary of 
the traits “usually associated with expertise” recently put together by 
Carlo Martini in his very informative (2020) overview on social epis-
temology of expertize. He notes that “[E]xperts back their judgments 
with arguments, and present evidence in support of their opinions 
(Martini 2020: 118). He calls this trait “objectivity”. Further, that “/E/
xperts have credentials, usually as a track-record of their experience in 
the relevant fi eld. And also that “experts give judgments within their 
fi eld of competence, they do not judge without qualifi cations on mat-
ters that are not in their fi eld of expertise. (Martini calls it “Pertinence 
(domain)” (Martini 2020: 118).3 Can we really imagine laypersons from 
our surrounding reaching consensus about who is the expert on, say, 
morality of abortion? Perhaps doctors, but not priests, some average 
women might claim. The pregnant women themselves and no one else, 
3 Further traits listed are social acclamation, unbiasedness. (i.e. “possession of 
content-knowledge; that is, information specifi c to the fi eld in which they possess 
expertise.” and meta-knowledge. (“Experts know how much they know and how 
much they do not know.”) (Martini 2020: 118). Finally, they exhibit consistency and 
are also able “to discriminate between very similar but not completely equivalent 
cases” (Martini 2020: 118).
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the more feministically oriented women would claim. Priests above all, 
our religious compatriots would say. No way, simple aggregation of 
lay votes would give nothing useful. On option two, citizens contribute 
their values, and decide about aims. Thomas Christiano proposed it 
and Snježana seems to agree with him.
citizens rule over the society by choosing the aims of the society and experts, 
along with the rest of the system, are charged with the tasks of implement-
ing these aims with the help of their specialized knowledge. (Christiano 
2012: 51)
We need experts on facts and this is obvious and quite trivial. But what 
about moral issues? We know that their bad mistakes are typical. Or at 
least, the disagreements are not easy to avoid. For the moment let us 
stay with Snježana’s list and take xenophobia as a typical anti-demo-
cratic stance. Here is an example of a contrast in attitudes, character-
istic for the presen decade.
Many citizens of Serbia accept that their country should be hospi-
table (to non-enemies). Citizens and experts, say in Belgrade, further 
agree that refugees are not enemies. Therefore, Serbia is not being op-
pressive towards refugees that come from Macedonia, and want to con-
tinue towards Germany.
In contrast, many citizens of Croatia favor the value of safety. Citi-
zens and experts agree that refugees are the threat to safety. Therefore, 
Croatia becomes oppressive towards refugees coming from Bosnia. Our 
former president said a year ago: you need some brutality to deal with 
them (and police brutality in this year, 2020, at the border with Bosnia, 
has become truly unbearable). So, both options look problematic. Looks 
like a dilemma for Snježana. What can be done? Snježana has interest-
ing constraints on deliberation:
Our ongoing discussion about the epistemic justifi cation of deliberative de-
mocracy has outlined several key conditions that should be incorporated 
into democratic procedures in order to ameliorate their reliability: (i) edu-
cation – public discussions and exchanges of reasons should be based on 
educational and informative content that improves the participants’ abil-
ity of conscientiously deliberate about various topics (ii) diversity – pub-
lic debates should include citizens and experts with different perspectives 
who come from different communities and institutions, thus expanding the 
available pool of evidence (iii) non-egoism (inclusiveness, fairness, plural-
ism ) – participants in public debate, both citizens and experts, must be 
aware of the cognitive constraints imposed by their presuppositions, world-
views and value systems, come to terms with their capacity to understand 
certain topics and maintain a disposition of openness towards different per-
spectives (iv) institutional organization – public discussions and decision-
making processes must be initiated, monitored and guided by relevant in-
stitutional procedures that guarantee adherence to prerequisites (i) – (iii). 
(Prijić-Samaržija 2018)
Some of these might help, in particular diversity and non-egoism. How-
ever, they are extremely demanding on ordinary citizens. To stay with 
abortion example, I fi nd it very diffi cult to take the pro-abortionist per-
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spective in my ordinary citizen role. And I don’t think the diffi culty 
comes from my egoism! A non-philosopher citizen, say a woman with 
fi rmly anti-abortionist stance, will fi nd it even more diffi cult.
In brief, there is no neutral, consensual way to choose experts. Any 
fi nal decision has to involve experts as well; if we want a kind of reli-
ability democracy, we shall have to trust the interaction between the 
two, and respect differences in view where experts with a certain at-
titude are aligned with laypersons sharing the attitude. But then, the 
deliberation has to accompany the choice of experts, and cannot pre-
cede it.
2. Could Deliberation Nevertheless Help?
Snježana herself noted, and we quoted her, that consensus is fi ne for 
ideal theory, whereas for the non-ideal one we need experts (2018: 
10). She then assumes that “any sub-ideal moral and epistemic cir-
cumstances render the concept of ‘rational’ consensus entirely unclear” 
(2018: 168). But why not look for parallels between the possibilities of 
ideal and of non-ideal theory; the two together might offer some hope 
to avoid the dilemma. Namely, there are parallels between ideal and 
sub-ideal constellations that enable us to do the following: fi rst, we can 
project the notion of ‘rationality’ downwards, from the ideal to the sub-
ideal: a sub-ideal constellation is ‘rational’ if it is suffi ciently close to its 
ideal counterpart. Second, we can go into opposite direction, and ask 
about a sub-ideal constellation if it approximates its ideal counterpart. 
Take the abortion example (we shall look at the other, xenophobia 
example few lines below). In non-ideal situation we shall have groups of 
similarly minded citizens, encompassing both expert and lay-persons. 
Religious Catholic Croats will normally side with local priests, femi-
nist lay-persons will side with feminist lawyers and social psycholo-
gists, and so on. And the groups, each containing experts and similarly 
minded lay-persons will enter “network of discourses and bargaining 
processes” as Habermas calls them (1996: 320). We can then project 
the division right into the Ideal formulation: idealized representatives 
of each group would debate the relevant issue between them, and the 
debate, in favorite cases, will produce truth or some similar epistemic 
justifi cation.
A similar picture is offered by Scanlon:
The central component of individual morality as I understand it – what I 
call the morality of what we owe to each other – is something we have rea-
son to care about because we have reason to care about our relations with 
others in which justifi ability of this kind plays an important role. There is, I 
believe a corresponding version of the morality of institutions, consisting of 
standards that institutions must meet if they are to be justifi able to those to 
whom they claim to apply. (2016: 20)
My proposal for answering Snježana’s doubt is that we retain the dual-
ity of less ideal deliberation in real world and of hypothetical contrac-
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tualist moral-political thought- experiments, in the tradition of Haber-
mas and Scanlon in the ideal theory.4
Let me stay with non-ideal approximation for the moment. Take 
the relevant division of a given society, say the class, gender, ethnic, 
religion or any other and imagine the following:
Let each group have its own experts: workers get the class-con-
scious intellectuals, entrepreneurs get Nozickian neo-liberal experts to 
articulate their needs, and so on.
Think of a representative of each group: she is representing both 
its experts and its popular basis, and then imagine them interacting, 
mostly by debating. They search for principles that
“could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to fi nd 
principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly 
motivated, could not reasonably reject.”, as Scanlon would put it (1998: 
4). In the process the proposals are made by parties, each of which 
include both the ordinary citizens and the similarly oriented experts.
Might this solve our dilemma? Or is it just a phantasy?Let me offer an 
extended example in favor of the optimistic answer. Start in a realistic 
spirit, with actual, non-ideal conditions. What do the efforts of increas-
ing public rationality normally look like in such conditions? Start with 
Snježana’s examples of political irrationality, say xenophobia, and con-
sider anti-refugee xenophobia spreading from Greece to Germany and 
all the way to Scandinavia.
Some efforts against it have been and hopefully more will be done 
within civil society, some on the higher, administrative level. Orthogo-
nally to this division, there is also the width division, the national vs. 
the global. Combine the two, and you will get four pigeon-holes, which 
are drawn three lines below. There are well-known examples for each, 
some listed within the table:
4 Here we agree with Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann:
Theorists of deliberative democracy are undoubtedly correct in thinking that it 
would be better—in epistemic as well as in many other respects—if interpersonal 
interactions were governed by the high standards approaching Habermas’s ‘ideal 
speech situation’. A raft of small-scale experiments trying to do just that show 
that, after formal deliberations in which moderators enforce such rules, people’s 
opinions are different in all sorts of ways that would presumably make them 
more competent voters. (We are skipping here the footnotes of the authors-NM) 
Although those are highly stylized deliberative settings, they are not without 
real-world political relevance. Many of those same standards are written into 
manuals of parliamentary practice, after a fashion. Even where they are not, 
they typically fi gure at least in manuals of good manners. Of course, both sets 
of instructions contained are often honoured in the breach. Still, it may not be 
beyond hope that those ideals might be approximated in the real world, at least in 
certain settings. Whether those experiences and experiments can be scaled up to 
the societywide level is an open question. Our point here is simply that they do not 
need to be. The epistemic benefi ts that come from interpersonal interaction (two-
way, or even just one-way) do not completely depend upon realization of those 
higher deliberative democratic ideals as a society-wide exercise—epistemically 
better though it would no doubt be, if that were realized.  (2018: 134)
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Narrow Wide-global
Civil Croatian and Slovenian NGOs 
acting in favor of refugees
Red Cross helping




However, this is only the beginning. The next important division con-
cerns constructive vs. critical activities. The former are omnipresent, 
the later are more characteristic of intellectual and journalistic area.
Next, look at the motivation. We can follow Habermasian inspira-
tion, and distinguish between more prudential, more moral, and more 
legal-cum-political motivation. Merkel’s motivation for inviting refu-
gees had a prudential component, German’s need of skilled workers, 
but it might have also been prompted by her moral attitudes. Marakesh 
pact is formulated in legal-cum-political terms, but one can perhaps hy-
pothesize some moral stance in the background.
Some actions will be exclusionary. On the positive side here is a 
bottom-up critical effort – belling-the-cat: warn common people against 
the lies and injustices directed against the refuges by establishment 
agents. (The Bellingcat enterprise did similar actions supporting mi-
norities and the like.)
What about experts and laypeople in this context? Some activi-
ties will demand experts, for instance critical journalist ones. Some 
demand collaboration between specialized experts and run-of-the-mill 
politicians. Others demand wide lay, non-expert engagement in order 
to succeed.
The hope is that there will be positive, virtuous circles along the 
line: experts will become more politically aware through their interac-
tion with lay-people and vice versa. Next, that there will be positive, 
virtuous circles both in the top-down and in the bottom-up directions. 
And, most important for our purposes, there will be interaction be-
tween the pro-groups and anti-groups, which might help towards more 
rationality in political life.
Take any of the items on Snježana’s list: radicalization, terrorism, 
fundamentalism, souverenism, nationalism, chauvinism, then Trump, 
Brexit, Orban…different kinds of populism, and fi nally pseudo-science: 
anti-vaxxers, creationism, climate changes deniers, etc.
For each of them we can fi nd examples of interactions similar to the 
ones we listed for the case of refugees.
Call all these interactions “deliberative interactions”. The hope is 
that they ultimately embody the requirements of deliberative democ-
racy For instance, for fi ghting the climate change denying discussed in 
the context of Habermas and deliberative democracy see Emilie Prat-
tico. Here is a quote:
Once the intricacy of the various modalities of reason that are at play in po-
litical problems becomes visible and, importantly, contestable through dis-
course, the Frankfurt School’s insight that our fate is tied to that of nature 
462 N. Miščević, The Limits of Expertism
descends to street-level, so to speak. Indeed, through deliberation we reach 
a position whence we can see, not only that ecological questions are also 
questions of justice, but that it is by seeking political resolutions to such 
problems through discourse that we might reasonably hope to solve them at 
all. There is no ‘getting it right’ without ‘getting it fair’, too. (Prattico 2019)
Scanlon comes very close to the same general stance; in his paper on 
institutional morality he points to parallels between matters of justice 
and matters of “public policy” (2016: 18). Once Habermas and Scanlon 
are in play, we can pass to the other side of the matters. We have looked 
at debates in actual, non-ideal circumstances. But Habermas and Scan-
lon primarily offer an ideal-theoretic version of debating, which can be 
applied to the same issues. They ask us to imagine a social-contract sce-
nario in which participants debate the burning issues; the new element 
is that the debating situation is somewhat idealized. We are asked to 
imagine the participants being more rational and fully informed. The 
propositions that such participants could agree upon would be written 
down in this hypothetical contract. (Habermas discusses the rationale 
for idealization, and a kind of parallel between the idealized and the real 
context in his (2001) dialogue with Thomas McCarthy).5
Imagine, to stay with our standing example, an idealized debate 
concerning refugees. In the debate refugees should have a representa-
tives, and potential host countries some representative as well, say one 
or two for, the rich and the middle. Now the representative, call them 
“the Rich” and “the Middle” are supposed to have full information; most 
importantly to know that, for example, Muslim refugees present no 
cultural threat to their countries. Next, they are supposed to be fully 
rational, capable of deriving consequences from initial premises.
We can imagine that ultimately the sides, the Refugees, the Rich 
and the Middle (representatives) might agree about a moderate right 
for the Refugees, for instance that the right of asylum is a defeasible 
human right (as Kieran Oberman proposes in his 2016 paper).
What would be the non-ideal counterpart of such agreement in 
our Croatian-Serbian example? One diffi cult to implement but easy to 
imagine solution would involve fi rst, the coming of both countries un-
der the same political umbrella, most simply, Serbia entering the EU. 
The next demand would be unifying the relevant legal arrangements. 
In the optimistic case, Croatian police would start following the same 
tolerant practice that Serbian police has been implementing in last fi ve 
years in favor of refugees.
The hope is that there is a signifi cant parallel between the ideal and 
the non-ideal version of the deliberative ideal. If the hope is realistic, 
as we hope it is, then Snježana’s doubts about the validity of rational 
deliberation in non-ideal situations can be laid to rest.
5 He concludes his discussion with the following telling statement:
…with idealizations we explain from a participant’s perspective the operations 
that actors must accomplish in their actual performance of certain everyday 
practices, namely those we describe as communicative action and rational 
discourse. (McCarthy 2001: 37)
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3. Conclusion
Snježana’s book is a highly original work, covering several fi elds within 
social epistemology, from the role of truth in social-political justifi cation 
to the relatively detailed questions concerning epistemic legitimacy of 
democracy. Her fi nal proposal of a version of reliability democracy, fea-
turing important epistemic-political role of experts, is promising and 
applicable to the actual crisis of democracy that we all witness.
The present paper has concentrated on the role of deliberation and 
the choice of experts. Snježana seems to favor placing democratic de-
liberation at the beginning of the building of consensus, with the role 
of designating experts, who then make further, epistemically solid de-
cisions concerning the problems at hand. She describes her project as 
a synthesis of Habermas and Rawls, but with fi rm reservations about 
Habermas’ contractualist project.
In the paper I ask the natural question: why not think of delib-
eration in contractualist tradition, proposed by Habermas and Scan-
lon and occasionally either praised or criticized by Snježana? I propose 
that what Snježana rightly sees as “the fundamental problem of Haber-
mas’ consensualism”, i.e. “its dubious application in condition that are 
less than ideal” (2018: 168) can be hopefully solved starting from the 
assumption that there is a parallel between the ideal and the non-ideal 
version of deliberative ideal. Authors like Gutmann and Thompson 
take deliberative democracy to be “an aspirational ideal” (2004: 37); 
the task is then to look at real-world, non-ideal approximations to the 
ideal, instead of separating the two by an iron fence. The issue of ex-
pertize then becomes part of the characterization of process of delibera-
tion, which starts with expert-laypersons grouping around particular 
stances on particular issues, continues with debate and deliberation 
performed by disagreeing groups, led by their respective expert intel-
lectual leaders, and hopefully converging towards a rational consensus.
So, let me conclude with a question for Snježana: How far would you 
agree with my picture? Or would you disagree completely and if yes, 
why?
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